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Abstract 
Dating apps for mobile devices, one popular GeoSocial app category, are growing increasingly popular. 
These apps encourage the sharing of more personal information than conventional social media apps, 
including continuous location data. However, recent high profile incidents have highlighted the privacy 
risks inherent in using these apps. In this paper, we present a case study utilizing forensic techniques on 
nine popular proximity-based dating apps in order to determine the types of data that can be recovered 
from user devices. We recover a number of data types from these apps that raise concerns about user 
privacy. For example, we determine that chat messages could be recovered in at least half of the apps 
examined and, in some cases, the details of any users that had been discovered nearby could also be 
extracted. 
Keywords 
Dating apps, mobile forensics, Android, privacy risks. 
Introduction 
Mobile devices (e.g. iOS and Android devices) and mobile applications, or apps, (e.g. healthcare apps, 
social networking apps, and VoIP apps) are rapidly becoming part of everyday life in both developed and 
developing countries. As with most new technologies, mobile devices and mobile apps can be used for 
criminal exploitation (Do, Martini and Choo 2015). There is a growing use of mobile devices and mobile 
apps to access and store sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII) data, such as healthcare 
and credit card details. As such, there is an increasing need for app users to have a better understanding 
of the privacy risks – an observation echoed in the study of Imgraben, Engelbrecht and Choo (2014). 
While users access these social platforms using a wide range of mobile devices, various statistics have 
suggested that Google Android is the dominant platform for mobile apps (Berg Insight 2013; 
Research2Guidance 2013). At the time of writing, Android reportedly has an 80% market share (Lomas 
2014). In the time since its release, Android has gone through much iteration and is still actively updated. 
For these reasons we have elected to use Android as a case study platform for our research on analysis of 
privacy risks in mobile apps. 
Before commencement of our research, we conducted a survey of publications on the general topic of 
Android mobile device and mobile app user security and privacy published between 1 Jan 20091 and 1 
May 2014. When conducting this survey, we found that there was little published work on the privacy 
implications of GeoSocial Networking (GSN) apps and services. A GSN app may be passive, requesting a 
user’s location when they “check-in”, such as with Facebook and Foursquare, or use a more active 
                                                             
1There is little research published prior to 2009 as the Android operating system (OS) was announced by the Open 
Handset Alliance, and made its debut to the public in the second half of 2008. 
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“proximity” system, where a user’s location is continuously broadcast to find nearby users or locations. 
Proximity-based GSNs are commonly used in “friend finder” or dating networks, as these users are more 
concerned with finding other users near to their location, rather than just seeing users from certain 
locations. Meet Me for Android, a popular proximity based meet up app, boasts 145 thousand Google+ 
recommendations and 90 million members. Proximity based apps are not very well represented in current 
research trends, likely because they have only recently come to be significantly popular. 
The research presented in this paper aims to contribute to an in-depth understanding of data privacy 
within a previously understudied app category that makes significant use of GSN, namely dating apps, 
both in an active data collecting capacity and profiling forensically recoverable data. Dating apps on 
mobile devices have come into public focus as popular dating sites, such as Plenty of Fish, are now 
reporting that 70% of usage takes place via a mobile phone. With the success of traditional dating apps on 
mobiles, many companies have taken the idea one step further and incorporated GSNs into their mobile 
dating app. For example, a study of the homosexual community found that many gay men surveyed had 
used smart phones and a GeoSocial app (Phillips et al., 2014) to facilitate casual meetings. This is not 
surprising when Grindr, a popular gay dating GSN, has millions of users and continues to grow daily 
(Grov et al., 2014). 
Adding active location broadcast to these apps has raised many security concerns as users already share 
many sensitive details on dating profiles. With sufficiently accurate location data, it is theoretically 
possible to determine a user’s address, track their movements and even stalk a user throughout the day 
(Cheung 2014). This has drawn a lot of media attention, especially to the popular Tinder app which was 
found to be sharing more accurate location data than intended, as users could be located to within 100 
feet of their present location (Dredge 2014). This is the second reported breach of privacy in the Tinder 
app, the first producing the exact latitude and longitude co-ordinates of users as well as their birth dates 
and Facebook IDs (Seward 2013). Both security flaws were uncovered by members of the community who 
chose to responsibly disclose the breaches and have since been fixed, but these details could easily have 
been used to track users both for lawful surveillance purposes and for unlawful malicious purposed. 
Aside from technical security breaches, these apps have also been used in traditional crime, such as 
targeted robbery and sexual assault cases (Koubaridis 2014; Wilson 2014), which have been tied to use of 
these services. But despite all of the hype and attention to GSNs and mobile dating apps, these services 
remain relatively understudied in traditional academic research, mainly being studied and analyzed only 
by enthusiasts. There is also limited support by professional forensic tools used by law enforcement and 
government agencies (e.g. EnCase, XRY, LANTERN, Paraben device seizure and ACESO), with most tools 
focusing on the more traditional address book and call log data. This inhibits the process of evidence 
collection, which is undertaken when a crime involving one or more of these apps is reported. At the time 
of research, we were only able to locate two prominent publications directly related to security of dating 
apps, both of which expose collusion exploits like the tinder example described above (Fattori et al. 2013; 
Qin et al. 2014). This research aims to contribute to filling this gap in contemporary research and 
highlighting both the privacy risks inherent in the data stored by the apps, while providing information on 
potential evidential artefacts for the prosecution of crimes. 
Experiment Setup 
To determine the extent of artefacts generated by dating apps, we conducted a forensic analysis on nine 
popular proximity dating apps. We simulated user actions within the app for common usage and then 
took a copy of the device data. This approach was identified as the closest to a real world scenario, as any 
device suspected of being involved or having evidence of a crime may become subject to forensic analysis 
and artefacts generated by these apps may be relevant. It is important to note that any artefacts that can 
be extracted by the forensic process could also be extracted by a malicious attacker, which could be a 
potentially significant breach of user privacy. Once located, the artefacts were evaluated as to their 
significance. 
The selected apps were chosen because they (1) allow viewing “nearby” users, and (2) ask for personal 
information upon sign-up or in their profiles, which includes photos, age, birthday, dating preferences, 
interests and often more personal details such as how many children a user has. They were also chosen for 
their popularity and large user bases. The final nine candidate apps were selected from the top 200 apps 
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in the social category of the Google Play store, the top 100 apps in the Google Play store’s lifestyle category 
and the selection of dating apps that had gained media attention as of 19th June 2014.  
Of the nine apps, it was discovered that two, Badoo and Blendr, were the same app with slightly different 
images for the user interface, and the Blendr app requested that users follow the Badoo terms of service. 
As both apps used the same account and operations, it was decided that Blendr should be excluded so as 
not to duplicate results.  
 
When undertaking the artefact collection we followed the process outlined in Figure 1, adapted from 
Martini, Do and Choo (2015a; 2015b), to ensure that we collected all relevant information saved by apps 
on the device. In addition to this process, as the code for these apps was mostly obfuscated and could not 
be directly analyzed, we captured the network traffic of each app while performing the standard actions of 
viewing a profile, sending and receiving a message and sending a photo through private messages if the 
function was available. Analysis was performed on an extraction of the data in the apps private directory 
using the adb pull and adb backup commands to preserve original data. Network traffic captures were 
recorded using a packet logger present on the device. At the end of the process, if data was found to be 
missing, more user actions would be performed to attempt to generate the missing data, and the process 
was repeated for the app in question. The experiment was performed using a Samsung Galaxy S3 GT-
I9300T running Android version 4.1.2. Extracted files were analyzed using suitable tools for each file type, 
such as SQLite 3.8.7 to examine database files and Notepad++ for text files and unknown file types.  
There are several limitations when dealing with Android in the context of examining application artefacts. 
The first is that many applications are essentially web wrappers for a mobile website, and do not store a 
great deal of data on the device. This may be circumvented by using the token directly on the website 
where available. The other concern when analyzing Android data forensically is the ability to access this 
data. This experiment maintains physical access to the device, but for this study, no passcode was set on 
the device, and phone data could be extracted in its entirety with root access. In real world scenarios, 
devices may not be this easy to access and may be encrypted. A more securely configured mobile device 
will generally complicate forensic efforts as forensic collection of evidential data from such devices 
without the cooperation of the device owner / user may be challenging (Hoog 2011), but this is a matter 
for cryptography specialists to explore and as such, is outside the scope of this work. 
Findings 
Our findings are organized according to the procedure in Figure 1, with the exception of the “Examine App 
Files on External Storage” step as no data was found on external storage for the apps that we have 
analyzed. For reproducibility, the version of each app is listed in Table 1. 
Application Name Version Number 
Badoo 2.46.3 (177) 
Grindr 2.1.1 (2072) 
Skout 4.3.3 (136) 
Tinder 3.2.1 (759) 
Figure 1. App Analysis Process, adapted from Martini, Do and Choo (2015a) 
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Jaumo 2.7.5 
Meet Me 8.7.1 (107) 
FullCircle 3.0.3 (22) 
MuiMeet 2.7.4 (53) 
Table 1. App Versions 
As the majority of apps analyzed use Facebook login credentials as their authentication provider, it is 
necessary to examine the possible use of recovered Facebook tokens. Facebook tokens obtained from 
these apps may be used to determine the identity of the account holder if they are using different details. 
By using the Facebook graphs API, the token may be submitted to obtain the users Facebook details. The 
graphs API may be queried with "https://graph.facebook.com/me?access_token=" followed by the token 
string obtained from the app to retrieve user information. In addition, if the app has been granted access 
to post for the user, status updates may be posted using that apps token by sending a POST request, 
however many apps request the right to post for a user separately from the initial login prompt. 
The following subsections describe our detailed findings for the first four apps analyzed (i.e. Badoo, 
Grindr, Skout and Tinder). The detailed findings for the remaining four apps have been omitted due to 
page constraints; however, the key findings from all eight apps are outlined in the Discussion section 
below. 
Badoo 
Based on the badoo.com website database, Badoo is one of two identical apps by the Badoo Company. The 
second app is called “Blendr” and both website and app are identical to Badoo, both use the same 
membership and the privacy policy on the Blendr website currently shows the Badoo privacy policy. The 
Blendr app stores the exact same files as the Badoo app tested in this section. 
Badoo gives users the option to restrict interactions from unverified accounts. Users can verify their 
account via two of the following: Facebook, phone number or subscription purchase. Badoo allows 
sending of images in chat. 
The [private app storage path] used by Badoo is /data/data/com.badoo.mobile. 
Examine App Files in Private Storage 
In the file “[private app storage path]/cache/[GUID]”, we located the following data of interest: 
• A list of the last messages received containing: 
o Username 
o Profile Picture URL 
o Last Message 
o Location at Suburb Level 
This information can be used to link the device to an account on the service and to establish an 
approximate last location they communicated from. It reveals the location of the user at the time the 
message was sent. 
In the directory “[private app storage path]/cache/downloader”, we located the following files of 
interest: 
• Image Files of All Viewed Profile Pictures 
o All images are “webp” or JPEG format and contain no metadata that we considered to be 
generally relevant. 
These profile images can be used to determine who the user may have been interacting with. 
In the directory “[private app storage path]/shared_prefs”, we located the following files of interest: 
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• com.facebook.SharedPreferencesTokenCachingStrategy.DEFAULT_KEY.xml 
• com.facebook.AuthorizationClient.WebViewAuthHandler.TOKEN_STORE_KEY.xml 
Both files contain the Facebook authentication token string for the app. Facebook tokens can be used to 
tie account identities together and gain access to information entered into Facebook by the user. 
Examine App Databases 
The app contains one database file in the “[private app storage path]/databases” folder, 
google_analytics_v2.db, which is used to store user agreement data and was empty in our experiments. 
In addition, the app contains cookies and webview databases located in “[private app storage 
path]/app_webview”, which contain cookies and autofill data. 
No other databases were located. The data of interest that we were able to locate in these databases is 
limited to the users email address. 
Analyze App 
Through network traffic monitoring we were able to collect profile pictures, chat, nearby users, user 
profile and device information. A preview of the last message sent or received from each user can be 
viewed, but not historical messages. The users profile is recoverable, along with a list of users they have 
declared as a “match”. Device information such as device model and OS version were also noted. 
Grindr 
Grindr is a gay dating app that shows nearby users available to chat. It allows chat between users and 
sending of photos. The app requires access to high GPS accuracy and will not show any user information 
until the GPS has reported the phone’s precise location. 
The [private app storage path] used by Grindr is /data/data/com.grindapp.android. 
Examine App Files in Private Storage 
In the folder “[private app storage path]/cache/Picasso-cache”, we found the following files of 
interest: 
• Image Files of All Viewed Profile Pictures 
o .0 files contain a GET request with the image URL 
o .1 files contain the image file itself 
These may be used to identify possible associates the user viewed or contacted. It can be used to identify a 
user's associates when combined with the matching database information (described below). 
In the folder “[private app storage path]/shared_prefs/”, we located the following files of interest: 
• Rules.xml which contains the following items: 
o Grindr Token 
o SessionID 
o Last Active Time (epoch value) 
o User’s Email 
The last active time may be used to indicate the device user’s interactions, and may be teamed with a 
network capture to obtain location information or cross matched with the databases to obtain the last 
messages sent or received. The users email being present allows a link to be established with other 
accounts to verify identity. 
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Examine App Databases 
The app contains five database files in the “[private app storage path]/databases” directory: 
• “1dfd3ff262804a5794a90eb9d3a15b9f”, an empty database with a single table named api_calls 
• grindr.db which stores all app data 
• webview.db for storing cookies on older Android systems 
• webviewCookiesChromium.db to store cookies on Android 4.0+ 
• webviewCookiesChromiumPrivate, used for incognito browsing cookies 
The grindr.db file is the most relevant, as it contains a significant amount of private data. The user’s 
complete profile dataset is stored in this database, along with the profile details of all other users they 
have viewed. This data is located in a “profile” table, which contains privacy sensitive formation such as 
birth date, distance to the user on last viewing, the last time they were seen online, account information 
from Facebook, Instagram or Twitter if it has been provided. It contains a field for an image hash that is 
linked to the image files in the Picasso image cache. The Grindr database also stores a “chat” table that 
contains all messages sent and received by the user and the date and time they were sent. 
A detailed listing of the data stored in the app databases located in the  
[private app storage path]/databases/Grindr.db directory is presented in Table 2 (see Appendix A).  
Analyze App 
Grindr sends all profile images unencrypted across the network. The user’s location is sent from the 
device to the Grindr server with country and city data as well as the exact latitude and longitude of the 
user. Combined with a timeframe, this can be used to track users as long as they stay connected to the 
same network. 
Skout 
Skout offers users the ability to chat with nearby users via a “shake to chat” option. 
The [private app storage path] used by Skout is /data/data/ com.skout.android. 
Examine App Files in Private Storage 
In the “[private app storage path]/shared_prefs/” directory, we found the following files of interest: 
• “LOGIN_PREFS.xml” 
• “com.facebook.SharedPreferencesTokenCachingStrategy.DEFAULT_KEY.xml 
Both files contain the Facebook token string. Facebook tokens can be used to link the app account with a 
Facebook account to obtain more information about the user. The token string can be used to directly 
request the details visible to the app. 
• “LOCATION_PREFS.xml” 
o “LOCATION_LAST_SENT_TIME” 
This value may be used in conjunction with the other information in databases and packet captures to 
map a user’s location or their last interactions. 
Examine App Databases 
The app contains six database files in the “[private app storage path]/databases” folder.  
• google_analytics_v2.db to store user agreement data 
• mixpanel is an empty database 
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• skout.db stores all the app data 
• webview.db for storing cookies on older Android systems 
• webviewCookiesChromium.db to store cookies on Android 4.0+ 
• webviewCookiesChromiumPrivate, used for incognito browsing cookies 
We determined that skout.db contains two relevant tables, skoutUsersTable and skoutMessages. The 
former contains a list of profiles the user has interacted with, their ID, name, profile picture URL, an ID 
for the last message sent and a timestamp for the last communication. SkoutMessages contains all 
messages sent and received. 
The Skout database located in [private app storage path]/databases/skout.db is outlined in detail in 
Table 3 (see Appendix A). 
Analyze App 
Skout sends profile images of all users unencrypted over the network. It sends user data as XML files 
which contain username, age, birth date, interests, last seen time, location at that time with country, 
suburb and distance data, and a profile picture URL. 
Tinder 
Tinder is a dating app that shows nearby users and allows users to mark them as a “match”. Users can also 
take a photo and share it as a “moment” so that all of their matches can see it. Users must verify their 
phone number before accessing this service. 
The [private app storage path] used by Tinder is /data/data/com.tinder. 
Examine App Files in Private Storage 
In the “[private app storage path]/cache/Picasso-cache” directory, we located the following files of 
interest: 
• Image Files of All Viewed Profile Pictures 
o .0 files contain a GET request with the image URL 
o .1 files contain the image file itself 
These may be used to identify possible associates the user viewed or contacted, in conjunction with 
database records. 
In the folder “[private app storage path]/cache/volley”, we located the following files of interest: 
• JSON requests stating whether the user was matched or not 
o matchIDs from tinder.db match table 
o The date the match occurred 
This establishes an association between user accounts at a certain time and can be used as a starting point 
that can be followed by searching app databases. 
In the folder “[private app storage path]/shared_prefs”, we located the following files of interest: 
• “com.facebook.AuthorizationClient.WebViewAuthHandler.TOKEN_STORE_KEY.xml” 
• “com.facebook.SharedPreferencesTokenCachingStrategy.DEFAULT_KEY.xml” 
Both files contain the Facebook token string, which can be used to communicate with Facebook. 
• “SP.xml” 
This file contains: 
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o The user’s Facebook token 
o The user’s latitude and longitude  
o The user’s Tinder token 
Tokens may be used to gain access to the account, and to any information retrievable from Facebook by 
the app, as long as they have not expired. The user’s latitude and longitude can be used to show where the 
user was when they last opened the app. 
Examine App Databases 
The app contains four database files in the “[private app storage path]/databases” folder: 
• tinder.db stores app data 
• webview.db for storing cookies on older Android systems 
• webviewCookiesChromium.db to store cookies on Android 4.0+ 
• webviewCookiesChromiumPrivate, used for incognito browsing cookies 
We determined that tinder.db contains the most data of interest, with tables for messages, analytic events, 
matches, photos and moments. The messages table contains all messages sent and received by the user 
with timestamps. The matches table lists all profiles the user connected with and the date of first contact. 
The moments table stores all viewable posts made by the user. The photos table contains photo ids and 
URLs. The analytics_Events table contains details such as the parameters sent over the network, 
including exact location in latitude and longitude, the type of network it is connected to and the deviceID. 
The details of the Tinder database found in [private app storage path]/databases/tinder.db are 
outlined in Table 4 (see Appendix A). 
Analyze App 
All profile images viewed were present in network traffic. The user’s location, sent to the Tinder server, is 
present in network traffic as precise latitude and longitude.  
Discussion 
The information that we considered to be of significant importance, which can be retrieved from the apps, 
is summarized in Table 2.  
App Name Messages Images Location Email Address Authentication 
Method 
Badoo/Blendr Only last 
received (and 
unencrypted) 
Profile Images Current – 
suburb level 
No Facebook Token 
Grindr Unencrypted in 
database 
Profile Images User exact 
location over 
network 
Yes Grindr Token 
Skout Unencrypted in 
database 
HTTP URL 
sent with 
profile 
Country, state, 
distance 
No Facebook Token 
Tinder Unencrypted in 
database 
Profile Images User exact 
location over 
network 
No Facebook Token 
Tinder Token 
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Meet Me Unencrypted in 
database 
Profile and 
Message 
Images 
No No Facebook Token 
Jaumo No URLs in 
database 
User exact 
location, 
which is sent 
in image 
filename 
No Facebook Token 
FullCircle Unencrypted 
over network 
(inc. images) 
Over Network Distance, over 
network 
Yes – over 
network 
Facebook Token 
MiuMeet Unencrypted 
over network 
HTTP Links 
over network 
User exact 
location, and 
other users in 
the suburb 
Yes – over 
network 
MiuMeet Token 
Table 2. Summary of Data Retrieved 
In half of the apps presented, we were able to recover messages sent or received by the user. All apps leak 
profile images to some extent, but only the FullCircle app leaked images attached to messages. Grindr 
contained the most data about other users, while Badoo appeared to have the least personal information 
viewable. Messages can be used to determine if users were in contact before an event occurred, or to 
confirm alibis, as in all cases the messages are time stamped when they are sent and received. Images 
attached to these messages may be highly personal in nature and would often be embarrassing if they 
became publicly available. These factors should present significant privacy concerns to users of these 
apps. In addition, where image URLs were recoverable, the image may be stored at the URL for an 
undetermined period of time. Many images were available several months after the information was 
obtained from the extracted files, and are easily accessible by any internet browser. 
Considering the personal nature of the information and images being shared over GeoSocial dating apps, 
it is disturbing that so much data can be so easily recovered. It is also problematic that many users are not 
aware how much data is being sent, stored and what their data is being used for. Many users would not 
appreciate their privately shared images and conversations being seen by third parties that they had not 
consented to. For example, section 11 of the Australian Privacy Principles outlines that entities must 
ensure reasonable steps are taken to protect information from misuse, loss, unauthorized access and 
disclosure. The recoverable data from network traffic logs and from the device’s persistent storage suggest 
that many of these apps are not taking reasonable measures to protect this private information. Sending 
user’s private conversations and images unencrypted, as FullCircle and MiuMeet do, is a significant 
breach of the user’s trust. 
To comply with user privacy, McIntyre and Casper (2014) suggest that consumers should be asked for 
their consent before any information is collected, and should have the use of the collected data made clear 
so they may make an informed decision about whether that data needs to be shared. Of all the apps in the 
experiment, only Grindr showed a user agreement on the first account login. All of the apps except for 
FullCircle had a privacy policy available on their respective websites, with the link to FullCircle’s privacy 
policy encountering an error at the time of this research. In addition, many of the apps that incorporated 
Facebook login asked Facebook for much more data than the user is informed of during the login process, 
such as the videos they have shared from other services like YouTube or Vimeo and pages they have 
"liked". Skout goes as far as to request their friends list with birthdays, which they are not explicitly asked 
about, and this is concerning because the Skout user’s friends are also not provided with any indication 
that this information is being obtained by the app. 
In countries where privacy laws have a philosophy of minimal collection with a specific focus on not 
denying access to a service because a person does not wish to enter personal information (e.g. South 
Korea – see Greenleaf and Park 2014), many of these apps would breach privacy laws. For example, both 
Tinder and Badoo would fail this privacy requirement, as they require proof of identity in the form of 
Facebook login and phone number verification before a user is able to access certain features or most of 
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the core service. The privacy laws also require organizations to keep data anonymized if possible, which is 
a requirement shared by the privacy acts of Germany and Australia. Using these principles as a guideline 
it is clear that many dating apps are collecting more information than required. In addition, South Korean 
privacy law states that a subject must be able to request deletion of data collected about them. Although 
many services offer a delete account function, these services do not provide assurances that they will 
remove all the information immediately or even at all. Many apps seem to shift the burden of privacy 
squarely onto the user, but as they do not display their privacy limitations clearly to the user, the user 
should not be held accountable. In a study by Liu (2014), almost all smart phone users admitted they had 
not sought out and read the privacy policy when using an app or website, with 95% of respondents 
deterred by the length of the privacy policy and 65% stating that it didn’t matter whether they read it or 
not, as their data was still being collected. They also stated that it is very difficult to read a full privacy 
policy from a smart phone screen. Although Grindr displays its privacy policy upfront, it is still very 
difficult for the user to read, and the user is able to agree to the policy without even scrolling through the 
entire text. 
Conclusion 
This research performed a case study analysis on nine popular Android mobile dating apps with the aim 
of identifying artefacts containing sensitive and personally identifiable information. These artefacts were 
analyzed to determine if they contained data that may be useful to malicious attackers seeking to breach 
user’s privacy and also to forensic practitioners seeking to locate evidence of a crime. It was found that 
dating apps store messages or location readings on the device that can be used to reconstruct events or 
prove an alibi, which may aid in the prosecution of crimes involving these apps. In many cases, activities 
performed on the dating app could expose other members of the community, such as in the Grindr 
database, where there is a collection of all profiles the user has seen nearby, and the Skout app, which 
collected Facebook data from non-Skout users. In two cases (i.e. the FullCircle and MiuMeet apps), 
private images were viewable, which could be exploited by a malicious actor and this is a clear violation of 
user privacy. 
The discovery of messages and other records, as well as Facebook tokens, are a privacy risk for users. 
While these experiments required physical access to the device, an attacker may be able to obtain these 
artefacts without physical access, which would have a greater impact on privacy (and potentially the 
physical security of the users, as highlighted in recent incidents involving dating apps). 
In addition to the forensic implications, these privacy findings have implications for app developers, 
suppliers (stores) and users. App developers must consider the types of sensitive data they are collecting 
and storing on mobile devices that may be subject to unauthorized access (either physically or remotely) 
and how this data can be better protected. For example, encrypting sensitive data stored on mobile 
devices may not resolve the issue of unauthorized access entirely, but it at least provides another layer of 
difficulty for a physical attacker to break through. App suppliers should also be implementing technical 
procedures to detect the improper storage of sensitive data on mobile devices during the initial app 
validation process. Finally, the greatest responsibility falls to users to protect themselves from apps that 
store sensitive data without appropriate protection. Users should be cautious when selecting apps, 
particularly those that they will be using to store and/or transmit personal data. The Android permissions 
system provides some insight to the user as to the capability’s apps will have to collect and transmit data 
(such as location and internet access privileges). However, these permissions are somewhat ineffective as 
they are quite coarse, for example, it would be unusual to find an app that does not request internet 
access, but it is difficult to know, as a user, exactly how this permission is being used (Do, Martini and 
Choo 2014). 
Future work includes further research in aspects related to data privacy, forensics and social networks. 
The Facebook authentication system should be further investigated, as it is unclear whether apps are 
using Facebook authentication tokens correctly to avoid abuse by malicious attackers. This is not limited 
to attackers with physical access, as the same results should be reproducible if the token is obtained 
without physical access. As with other app or app category specific research, it is recommended that 
further research be conducted on a wider range of popular social dating apps.  
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APPENDIX A – APP DATABASE LISTINGS  
“blocks” Table 
Attribute Description 
profile Unique profile id 
timeStamp Date and time the user was blocked 
isBlocked Boolean to show user is blocked 
“bodyTypeField” Table 
fieldID Unique ID to link to “profile” table 
name Body type descriptor 
“broadcast” Table 
messageID Message id number 
expirationDate Date to stop displaying the message 
“chat” Table 
messageID Unique message identifier 
Source ProfileID of message sender 
Target ProfileID of message recipient 
Timestamp Epoch time message was sent 
Type Determines message type to be displayed 
Body Message content, can be text or image 
Unread Boolean determining whether to display message 
as new 
Failed Boolean to show whether message sending failed 
“ethnicityField” Table 
fieldID Unique ID to link to “profile” table 
Name Ethnicity 
“flagReason” Table 
fieldID Unique id number  
Name Reason for reporting a user 
“imageGallery” Table 
messageID ID of message image was attached to 
mediaHash Hash of picture file 
Profile Profile ID value 
“lookingFor” Table 
Profile Unique profile id 
lookingForId fieldID value from “LookingForField” table 
“lookingForField” Table 
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fieldID Key to link from “LookingFor” table 
Name Name of category user is “looking for” (e.g., 
friends, chat) 
“moderation” Table 
messageID Unique message id 
Message Message content 
Type Type of moderation 
mediaHash Unique identifier for picture 
Unread Boolean value determining whether to show the 
message as read 
“profile” Table 
profileID Unique profile identifier 
about About me message entered by user 
age User set age 
birthdate User set birth date 
isBlocked Boolean value determining whether a user can 
contact you 
isBlocker Boolean value determining whether you can 
contact a user 
bodyType Foreign key to bodyTypeField table 
children how many children they have 
displayName The last seen display name for that profile 
ethnicity Foreign key to ethnicity table 
weight weight in grams 
facebookID Facebook url ending 
headline Users headline from profile 
headlineDate Last update to headline in Epoch time 
height Height in centimeters 
isCurrent value marking the logged in user 
isFave Boolean marking favourite users 
Version Version number from users app 
profileImageHash Hash of image (Links to image url in Picasso-
cache folder) 
relationshipStatus Foreign key to relationshipField table 
showAge Boolean determining if user age is visible 
showDistance Boolean determining if distance to user is visible 
twitterID Twitter username 
instagramID Instagram username 
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lastSeen Last date this person was seen in epoch time 
profileStatus Empty field 
Table 3. Overview of Grindr Database Tables 
 
“skoutUsersTable” Table 
Attribute Description 
userID Unique ID 
userName Current username 
picUrl Address of image for profile 
userLastMessageID Last message sent to this user 
lastMessageTimestamp Epoch time of last message 
“skoutMessages” Table 
messageID Unique message number 
Timestamp Epoch time of message 
fromUserID Senders id 
toUserID Recipients id 
chatID ID to group chat messages together 
Type Type of message, normal, picture or rich text, Rich 
only comes from admin accounts 
Message The message body 
addedFrom Empty field 
messageOrdered Boolean value 
Table 4. Overview of Skout Database Tables 
 
“messages” Table 
Attribute Description 
User_id User id of chat partner 
Match_id ID of match between user and chat partner 
Client_created Empty 
Created Timestamp of the message 
Has_error If there’s an error in sending 
Text Body of the message 
Viewed If the message has been read 
“Analytic_Events” table 
timestamp Timestamp of the event 
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Name Name of event 
Params Parameters of the event such as userID, latitude, 
longitude, network type and deviceId 
“facebook_friends” Table 
Id User id 
Name Users name 
Avatar_url url of profile picture 
State Empty 
Tinder Tinderid 
“Match_requests” Table 
Empty table 
“matches” Table 
Id Match id 
User_id User id 
Created Date the match was made 
Last_activity Date of last activity between user and matched 
user 
Server_message_count Empty 
Touched Whether the user has sent any messages to the 
match 
Viewed Whether the match has been viewed 
User_name The username of the match partner 
Draft_msg Empty field 
Reported_for Whether the user has been reported 
Gender 0 or 1 for male and female 
Following Whether the matched user is being followed or 
ignored 
“Moment_likes” Table 
Empty Table with Date, Moment_id, Liked_by_id, Thumb_url, Has_been_viewed, Mixed_id, and 
By_user_id attributes 
“moments” table 
Id Id of moment data 
User_id Id of user that created the moment 
Created Date of creation 
Text Any text posted with the moment 
Photo_id Id of image file attached 
Filter Filter on image file 
Text_alignment Any text added to image 
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Text_size The size of the text 
Text_height The height of the text 
Is_pending Whether the moment has been posted publicly yet 
Has_failed Whether the post has failed 
Rated_type Whether the post is rated 
Num_likes The number of users who have liked the moment 
“photos” Table 
Id Id of photo 
User_id User id of photo owner 
Image_url URL of image if hosted 
Origin_x Image offset on x axis for cropped images 
Origin_y Image offset on y axis for cropped images 
Height Height of image 
Width Width of image 
Xoffset_percent Scaled image details 
Yoffset_percent Scaled image details 
Xdistance_Percent Scaled image details 
Ydistance_Percent Scaled image details 
Photo_order Photo index number for photo sets 
“photo_moments” Table 
Id ID of photo moment 
Large Url of large sized image 
Med Url of medium sized image 
Orig Url of original image 
Small Url of small sized image 
thumb Url of image thumbnail 
Table 5. Overview of Tinder Database Tables 
